As is evident with the situation in Iraq, finishing a war is more problematic than starting one. Conflict termination was achieved in approximately 30 days of combat, but conflict resolution does not appear imminent. According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S.-led coalition is attempting unfamiliar and unique methods to resolve the conflict. 1 Recent debate, however, has raised tremendous concern whether conflict resolution in Iraq will ever evolve with current U.S. policy. As a result, U.S. President George Bush and his Administration continue to revise U.S. policy in Iraq.
The debate between the U.S.-led coalition and its installed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), between the U.S. Administration and Congress, and between the U.S. and the UN exposes disagreements concerning the legitimacy of U.S. policy and the effect that policy has or will have on Iraqi sovereignty. In this environment, three policy options have emerged on how to attain conflict resolution: the initial U.S. policy, a proposal made by several members of the IGC, and France's proposal. (There are many nations and entities that argue the same issues as the French, but for simplicity sake, the third policy option will be referred to as the French option.) Following a brief introduction of each policy option, and an historical examination of three conflict resolution case studies involving the U.S., this paper will propose a solution that can gain legitimacy in every facet of this project, and resolve the conflict in Iraq.
With the hope of developing the appropriate approach to conflict resolution in Iraq, the Bush Administration has recently modified several milestones while simultaneously searching for a valid UN role in the process. One such milestone is the transfer of political responsibility to the IGC by 1 July 2004. And, as a re-entry point for the UN, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, recently announced that he would send a mission back to Iraq as soon as its safety could be assured. These step further indicate a realization that U.S. policy in Iraq must achieve legitimacy with Iraqis, within the Region, and in the International community. Only after this is achieved, will the U.S.-led coalition assist Iraq reestablish sovereignty, and create a peaceful Iraq capable of positive contributions to the region and the world.
OVERVIEW: THE FRAMEWORK FOR REESTABLISHING IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY
The past does not always provide a clear path for the future, but it is all we have from which to draw useful lessons. Before venturing into the current situation, one has to have some appreciation for modern U.S. intervention into sovereign entities and its previous involvement in Iraq. Specifically, it is important to appreciate lessons from recent conflict resolution attempts,
as well as what occurred in Iraq after Operations Desert Shield and Storm against Saddam
Hussein's regime in 1991.
A review reveals that the U.S has interposed or intervened in other countries' internal affairs since the early 1800s when the Marines forcefully boarded and scuttled the Philadelphia.
This action precipitated the Barbary Wars against the North African pirates and resulted in the establishment of freedom of the seas. Many interventions delivered tangible benefits like this, but generally the overall results of these forays are mixed. 2 Within the last century, the U.S. has attempted to resolve conflicts by intervening in other countries' affairs sixteen times; twelve of these attempts were pursued unilaterally. 3 Clearly, the U.S. is active in this arena. But this does not mean it has been very successful. On the contrary, the lessons learned from these ventures highlight that conflict resolution is difficult at best. 4 Likewise, the poor results from unilateral U.S. actions signify that tremendous challenges would confront the U.S. in Iraq. Using U.S. history as a guide, gaining legitimacy in Iraq and in the region, especially unilaterally, would be an extremely challenging endeavor, and if not done properly, could fail entirely.
When it last intervened militarily in Iraq, the U.S. garnered overwhelming international support and consent. In 1991, a U.S.-led coalition ejected Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Saddam
Hussein's forces were routed. He and his generals had no alternative but to sign a cease-fire agreement, and meet the severe demands of the international community. The coalition achieved conflict termination in a brief 100-hour war, but did not achieve any resolution to the conflict even after 10 years of a enforcing the agreements by a greatly reduced coalition.
Disputes over Iraq's compliance with UN demands for scrapping weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and concerns over the execution of the UN oil-for-food programs were two leading causes for international cohesion disappearing. 5 Due to diminished international cohesion, Saddam Hussein was able to violate practically every condition spelled out in the cease-fire agreement and in the concomitant United Security Council Resolutions UNSCR). 6 The tragedies of "9/11" left Administration established the framework upon which the U.S. and, it was hoped, the international community would reestablish Iraqi sovereignty, and resolve the conflict in Iraq.
TRANSITION TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: IS THERE LEGITIMACY?
Before analyzing conflict resolution in Iraq, one has to understand the difference between conflict termination and conflict resolution. Conflict termination, as defined by Peter
Wallensteen alludes to victory of one party over another. One party dominates the other and is able to impose its order on the other. 12 U.S. Joint Doctrine states that conflict termination is achieved by applying military force towards an objective that defines the peace. Simply stated, conflict termination is nothing more than the cessation of hostilities, which establishes the condition for conflict resolution. 13 What is not stated, however, is the dependence of conflict resolution on the condition or nature of the environment at conflict termination.
Conflict resolution as defined by Wallensteen is a purposeful search for ways of accommodating explicit interests of the parties in conflict. 14 Conflict resolution is the process of facilitating a solution where the actors no longer feel the need to indulge in conflict activity and feel that the distribution of benefits in the social system is acceptable. 15 In other words, all parties can agree to a path to peace, and are mutually satisfied with the outcome and solution to the disagreement. 16 Using these definitions, one can discern that the official transition between conflict termination and conflict resolution in Operation Iraqi Freedom occurred when President Bush declared that the major fighting was over on 1 May 2003.
Even before 1 May, however, military forces continued to secure the peace throughout Iraq, and align their efforts to harmonize the interagency process and coalesce their endeavors with the civilian participants. As this administrative transition occurred, a series of localized clashes and battles erupted in central Iraq. The difficulty with these seemingly minor battles is that their combined effects were challenging the very legitimacy the U.S. was attempting to gain.
The lack of security was distancing or alienating many Iraqi people from the U.S. and its allies, strengthening the non-interventionist position of the non-participating countries, and testing U.S.
public support. The U.S.-led coalition struggled simultaneously with securing its presence in the region, finding and defeating an enemy that was hard to define and locate, and trying to win the support, or at least tolerance, of the Iraqi people and the international community. 21 This dichotomy has not produced peace, and the struggle to achieve conflict resolution continues as the blame for the disorderly environment is placed on U.S. policy itself.
As the Administration and its key leaders inside of Iraq modify U.S. policy to achieve success, the dissenting voices grow louder. The U.S. Presidential election is under way, and the contentious conflict resolution policy is becoming more politicized. It is essential that the Administration consider various strategic alternatives against the backdrop of the historical lessons learned regarding conflict resolution. Then the Administration can develop a policy that establishes Iraqi sovereignty in a way that gains legitimacy.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN IRAQ: THREE ALTERNATIVES
Security is a key consideration in the three alternatives to conflict resolution that have been promulgated in recent months. The first alternative, U.S. policy from April to November 2003, created a two-track process, security and politics, under the supervision of the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD). The policy was centered on the certainty that Iraqis would neither establish nor operate federal institutions until there was security. 22 Functioning political and civic institutions are necessary for establishing legitimacy and re-establishing sovereignty.
Without these institutions, the U.S. believed that long-term stability would not flourish, and Iraqi lives would not improve in material terms. The absence of stability and improvement would discourage any Iraqi support of the ongoing reconstruction effort. 23 Only when coalition, and
Iraqi security forces created a safe environment would the Iraqis participate in conflict resolution. Originally, the security effort included a very broad approach -coalition soldiers raiding houses where insurgents and terrorists hide, civilian engineers repairing electrical generators, Iraqi school teachers preparing lessons from textbooks cleansed of Saddam Hussein's indoctrination, and newly trained Iraqi border guards checking passports against lists of terrorists. 24 Concurrently, with CPA and international assistance, the IGC was producing its own military and security forces. 25 These forces included the New Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), The Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Border Police and Immigration and Customs Service, and the Facilities Protection Service. After these indigenous security forces were organized, trained, and equipped, the U.S. incorporated elements of them into service.
The objective was to incrementally transfer responsibility to the Iraqis. This move created legitimacy with the citizens, and gave Iraqis confidence to pursue civil matters.
As part of this legitimacy in civic matters, the U.S. has already appointed members from Iraq's various factions to the IGC. Together with the U.S., the IGC began to resolve complex questions on the boundaries of the provinces in a federal Iraq, ensuring religious liberty and equality, as well as create the right system of government to manage Iraq's distinctive ethnoreligious mix. 26 Additionally, the IGC would oversee the drafting, writing and ratification of the constitution, and coordinate a free and democratic election. Only when all this is accomplished, did the U.S. intend to give Iraq full control of self-governance. The U.S. preferred an orderly process that was neither hurried nor delayed. The initial U.S. estimate was that Iraq would have self-rule within one to two years.
The U.S. recently modified its policy by establishing a political transition suspense of 1
July 2004 and has invited the UN to ascertain if elections can occur sooner. Internal Iraqi factional impatience and challenges to U.S. policy, as well as internal U.S. pressure, compelled the U.S. to take these steps. Meanwhile, international participation and support has grown to nearly 20 nations. Nevertheless, the U.S. maintains that international cooperation and improved burden sharing warrants America's leadership in both tracks, solidifying strategic unity of command of the entire conflict resolution process.
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The second alternative is proposed by the IGC and outlines a similar timeline for the transfer of power. The IGC feels that fixing a date to this significant event is essential to establishing legitimacy with its citizens. Therefore, it calls for the transfer to occur in the political track immediately, and in the security track within the year.
The IGC concurs fully with the U.S.'s two-track application and the many procedures;
however, the Iraqi organization disagrees with U.S. policy on three counts. First, Iraqis believe a paradox is created by the U.S.-led military coalition in charge of the security track. From this perspective, using the same force that removed Saddam Hussein's regime has resulted in unforeseen challenges to creating a secure environment. 28 Secondly, the IGC feels that Iraqi citizens may perceive a gap in Iraqi sovereignty with a tardy transfer of power. 29 And finally, the Council senses that without rapidly assuming control of the political track, citizens of Iraq and neighboring countries will consider any Iraqi administration as a U.S. puppet.
The IGC alternative calls for a change in the security force composition because the As for creating legitimacy within the political track, the IGC fears that any perceived gap in Iraqi sovereignty will derail the entire process. Therefore, the IGC wants to send a message to the Iraqi citizens and the world that Iraq has control of its own destiny and together will rapidly move to secure Iraqi sovereignty. The immediate partial turnover of certain elements of the political process, with a phased transition of power attached to a timeline will speed up the entire process, and ultimately ensure lasting conflict resolution. 31 In Whereas security matters dominate the initial U.S. policy, the IGC sees that having a more balanced relationship between the security and political tracks is essential. On the other hand, while acknowledging the role of security, the French option sees politics as the critical track for Iraqi sovereignty. To this end, the French assign a larger role to the UN in both the political and security tracks. Without the UN, France does not envision regional nation states and the International Community granting legitimacy to either track. French officials argue that without this regional and international support, the chance for peace in Iraq is greatly reduced.
Like the IGC, France perceives a similar paradox with the U.S.-led coalition at the helm of all security matters. The French President, Jacques Chirac, contends that immediately turning over the political track to the Iraqis will provide a speedy resolution of all security issues.
He believes that gaining legitimacy in the political process will reduce the security challenges dramatically and instantly. The answer, therefore, is an international military presence that responds to UN direction, but is under the command of the "main troop contributor." 33 To add legitimacy and encourage Iraqi support, this multi-national approach must assume a peace building posture to send the signal that "we are here to help," and remove the perception of an occupying power.
The French also assign a more crucial role to the UN in the political track. Even though the IGC is considered to lack any mandate from the people due to its structure and selection process, the French proposal provides for imminent transfer of power to the IGC. At the same time, France calls for the UN and the IGC to create a "provisional" Iraqi government that will assume the political responsibilities within 90 days. Without true representation of the people, the French believe that Iraqis will not be confident that the government is addressing its citizens' needs, or that the lives of Iraqis will improve materially. 34 The In all three alternatives, the cornerstone is the legitimating effort in Iraq. To this end, policies focus on the two principal tracks to conflict resolution -politics and security. The distinction among the three options is threefold -the relationship between the two tracks, the timeline for the transition of power in both tracks, and the effect that the relationship and timeline have on building legitimacy of purpose. Whereas the security track is essential to U.S. policy, each track is equal in the IGC option, and the political track takes primacy in the French approach. As for self-governance, U.S. policy calls for a gradual process, the IGC calls for a more rapid transition, and the French demand an immediate transition of power. And finally, the proponent of each of these options believes that its alternative will achieve legitimacy more effectively and efficiently, and that only its proposed process will lead to a lasting peace. In ECLIPSE, Germany was rebuilt from the bottom up, starting with local elections and councils. After responsibility and authority was transferred to the indigenous leaders at the local level, the Allies focused on state governments. Only after the lower administrations were in place were national elections considered. This bottom-up effort fostered legitimacy within each community first, facilitating local support for the Allied efforts.
U.S. HISTORY LESSON: PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT CONFLICT RESOLUTION
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Reestablishing the judicial system was very challenging due to the thorough corruption brought on by the Nazi party. The initial plans called for complete removal of the Nazi party, or
De-Nazification, regardless the level of support any individual provided to the regime. The U.S.
changed this method, and found ways to retain and return to their positions, qualified senior managers who did not have a proven record of corruption. The Allies developed a vetting mechanism to screen and include former Nazi party members after the German national provided an oath of allegiance. This enabled experienced administrators to participate in the development of the local civil institutions including the entire legal spectrum.
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After selecting several educated and loyal Germans, the Allies trained them to be lay judges and lawyers. This proved most beneficial, enabling the rapid return of law and order.
Furthermore, to perform routine governmental functions, the U.S. and the Allies relied primarily on indigenous bureaucracies. 40 By using respectable, local individuals that were loyal to the cause, the Allies got the government "moving" quickly, concurrently legitimizing the process. To enhance the budding legitimacy, the U.S. approached the economic solutions holistically. The efficient and large humanitarian effort combined with the economic policies and the establishment of government services improved the quality of living immediately and for the long-term benefit of the Germans. All were managed by German nationals and visible to the Germans and their neighbors. Since the citizens could see material improvement for them and their nation, they openly participated and supported the endeavor. 41 ECLIPSE planners understood that effective state institutions evolve out of the nation's social structure, cultural norms, and distribution of political power. Therefore, they did not radically alter the existing constitution, governmental agencies and subordinate programs.
Furthermore, they empowered the trusted German nationals to adjust programs and policies to reflect their identity and culture. These uniquely German institutions coupled with the open support for the political aspects, the large number of U.S. and Allied military forces and the establishment of a strong constabulary force effectively preempted most resistance. 42 The successful security programs, generous humanitarian effort, along with the highly educated and economically developed society effectively established Germany's acceptance back into the international community and helped to stabilize the region. the civilian effort. 43 The military effectively achieved their GFAP objectives within the year, enforcing the peace and providing a generally secure area for the civilian aspects to take hold.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
The OHR-led efforts were less effective. 44 The PIC provided final authority in theater to OHR regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian implementation of the Peace Settlement. The OHR's authority, however, did not translate into actual power. 45 As a result, there was a lack of cooperation between the many organizations striving to resolve the civil aspects of the GFAP. This further weakened the lack of unity of effort between NATO and the OHR ; the two tracks -military and civil. 46 In order to advance the peace, the military expanded its mission into the civilian aspects of nation building.
Two factors that further exacerbated the challenging situation were the premature elections and the further expansion of organized crime. Both came as a result of the joint civilmilitary failure to establish viable democratic institutions early. Due to the U.S. Administration pushing for a one-year military operation, the OHR imposed an abbreviated timeline for elections. Therefore, elections were held at every level of society prior to the establishment of government institutions. Afterward, there was an enormous amount of time and energy devoted to removing several democratically elected officials suspected of war crimes. This resulting void in governance and associated absence of government services opened the door even wider for expansive smuggling and illegal trafficking. Therefore, the local citizenry saw no benefit to the efforts of the international community and many took matters into their own hands, exacerbating the economic problems and shortcoming of the civil programs. 47 Some additional deficiencies of the OHR involvement were its inability to curb the discordant and irredentist objectives of the external Serbian and Croatian governments, and to strengthen the constitutional authority of the Bosnian national government. 48 Bosnia's neighbors and the indecisiveness of Bosnia's elected officials were undermining the civil aspects of the GFAP, reducing any possibility of achieving legitimacy with the Bosnians, regardless to which faction they belonged, and throughout the region. 49 The military coalition, on the other hand, met its objectives. One facilitating aspect was its placement of representative military forces. Russians and Turks forces, for example, were situated in areas where they immediately accrued legitimacy in the eyes of the locals. The international military cooperation signaled international resolve as well as indicated to the Bosnians that the military was not an occupying force. Nevertheless, near immediate military successes were not enough to overcome the lack of unity of effort between the civil and military tracks and the inadequacy of some UN programs, and the military gradually expanded its role.
This "mission creep" was necessitated by OHR deficiencies: apprehending war criminals and removing suspect members of the regime was not accomplished quickly enough, and in some cases, not at all; not reducing or destroying vitriolic nationalist radio stations fueled interethnic hatred; finally the UN's agency for enforcing law and order, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), took eight months to form, and then took another four years to influence the local police forces. 50 It took far too long to stabilize security throughout the country, which was not conducive to reintegrating the country, ultimately aborting any legitimacy.
The military continues to serve successfully in Bosnia, and the civilian efforts have improved immeasurably, sustaining international financial assistance that continues to play a key, positive role in economic policymaking. But, the initially unsuccessfully coordinated or directed civilian efforts, and the rather slothful development of their associated program did not reduce the political divisiveness that fueled the conflict in the first place, and weakened the local security environments, specifically with regards to containing illegal economic activities.
Additionally, the civilian efforts failed to change the attitudes of indigenous peoples in terms of legitimizing the goals and objectives of the international community. Furthermore, leaders in neighboring countries did not support, and openly contradicted the international efforts.
Together, these hurdles have delayed conflict resolution in Bosnia, and thus the establishment of Bosnian sovereignty. Basically, the GFAP was flawed. As a result, Bosnia with all of its factions and fractures has still not fully reentered the international community after nine years of international efforts. Applying lessons learned from the failure of OHR in Bosnia, however, the UN became the leading agent in the political efforts. Planners properly applied some additional lessons from Bosnia, which has been significant to the successful operations.
Kosovo
Unlike Bosnia, there is less of a gap between the two tracks; unity of effort is clearly more evident. The civil and military aspects of conflict resolution in Kosovo may be under different management, but both work tirelessly to ensure the mandates and capabilities of the two functional entities overlap sufficiently to reduce the possibility of, or minimize any existing gap. As an example, the military, or KFOR, assumed responsibility for all security operations immediately after arriving, and continued these programs until the UN civil police forces, or UNMIK were ready. Despite the extensive time it took for the UN to stand up UNMIK and assume responsibility, contributing militaries in KFOR applied significant efforts training local authorities to perform law enforcement and general maintenance of public security.
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KFOR also assumed responsibility for humanitarian efforts upon its entrance into Kosovo. Planners had the forethought to ensure a transition to UN coordination and control occurred as soon as the UN and the international agencies became operational. This assisted in developing a perception within the local communities that KFOR forces were truly present to resolve the peace, and not for some ulterior motive. KFOR conducting both security and humanitarian services could have created the paradox identified by the IGC and the French concerning U.S. efforts in Iraq. But, the opposite was true. 53 There was some confusion within the civilian community as to whom they should turn for assistance even after the UN agencies were in place; but, ultimately, the indigenous people provided support legitimizing the combined efforts of KFOR and the international agencies under UN control. 54 Too many challenges in the establishment of local governments, however, have stunted progress with regard to the transfer of control to Kosovars. This process has been complicated due to the desire of the locals to follow those who led them in the resistance movement, and KFOR and the UN ignoring this issue. Slowly, and with much difficulty, the UN appointed successors and assumed the unpopular responsibility of displacing "so-called" democratically appointed officials. In addition, other challenges arose from the absence of any independent government prior to the conflict. It took much intervention on the part of the UN to establish the necessary agencies. Initially, expatriates staffed these government services. Subsequently, however, appointed locals were paired with these outsiders for training and familiarization as well as ensuring these agencies reflected the nation's unique characteristics.
In short, the perception of the Kosovars has changed, but due to the planned delay in determining Kosovo's final status, to the steady transfer of civil and military responsibilities to local control, and to strong international efforts to strengthen the support throughout the region.
Their view of the immense international effort and interest, as well as the fact that they are now in charge, has persuaded them to trust the UN and NATO more, and join in resolving the issues, legitimizing the collective international civil and military efforts. This distinct method that drew on the lessons learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict resolution led to elections within two years, and an economic recovery not seen since the post-World War II era. 55 Very quickly, the multi-national effort established legitimacy within the local communities, throughout Kosovo and the Balkans region as well as in the international community; and the province is being reintegrated into the region.
ANALYSIS: ENSURING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IS NO MIRAGE
The three historical case studies are useful in analyzing the three alternatives considered for resolving the conflict in Iraq. From the perspective of all three case studies, the current U.S. policy of assigning DoD as the single office for coordinating security and political activities provides a valuable unity of command that solidifies the effort and eliminates any strategic gap between the political and security tracks much as occurred in ECLIPSE. This paper is not making a proposition that DoD is or is not the appropriate office to be managing conflict resolution in Iraq, but properly applying this principle, unity of command, at the strategic level will ensure that actions in either area will be synchronized and complementary. Another useful element is the CPA working closely with the IGC to ensure all political and civic institutions are functional, and that institutional checks and balances are emplaced before transferring power. This should ensure Iraq evolves into a viable nation state. However, keeping the U.S. selected IGC as the sole form of Iraqi federal government while the U.S.
retains sole command of the overall operation might create the perception that Iraq is a U.S.
puppet and that the U.S. has ulterior motives. This is unlike the experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo in which the UN was employed effectively and eliminated any perception of a single dominant or controlling nation in charge of all political and military activities. Nothing could be worse for Iraq's future than the creation of a puppet government unable to keep the peace and susceptible to the charge that it was sovereign in name only. 56 Removing all Iraqi military and civilian leaders with ties to the Baathist regime in the manner of the German occupation without question raises additional challenges to U.S. motives in the region. This ultimately jeopardizes both security and political efforts, and creates an immediate pool of recruits for those who oppose U.S. action. Furthermore, keeping the U.S.
DoD as the singular leader of all conflict resolution procedures can strengthen the perception that the U.S. military is an occupying force with the goal of creating a U.S. protectorate.
Modifying policy by applying the strengths from the IGC COA can eliminate this perception, particularly important in an environment which, unlike World War II, did not involve total capitulation at the end of a prolonged struggle.
One such strength in the IGC COA is the rapid but incremental transfer of federal political power to the Iraqis. As we derived from the ECLIPSE and Kosovo lessons, strengthening the local governments early conveys legitimacy to the indigenous people much more quickly. The resulting support the locals may give to outsiders is beneficial to both the security as well as the political efforts. As was evident in all three case studies, however, care must be given to ensure that the system reflects Iraqi customs, traditions, and psyche.
Ultimately, this will enhance nation-wide participation in building lasting political and civic institutions. Therefore, giving the IGC control over this process sooner rather than later is worth considering. If this is done, the U.S. or UN can remain involved after the earlier transfer of power and mentor the leaders through the elections. This way, the U.S. can help establish the political institutions, facilitating the development of an appropriate democratic system for the Iraqis, and one that may be acceptable to the U.S., and more importantly, tolerable to Iraq's neighbors.
A second strength of the IGC alternative is that of involving the Iraqi interior minister in security matters. As attempted in the two Balkans cases, a rapid movement toward indigenous security forces providing protection to the well being of their own, will strengthen the coalition's efforts and eliminate the perception of an occupying force with ulterior motives. Furthermore, an engaged minister will strengthen the resolve of the Iraqi military and police forces, enhance a speedier transfer of responsibility to Iraq's security forces, and provide practical experience for the assumption of full responsibility a la Kosovo. One weakness of the IGC COA that any policy must avoid is the singular focus on internal legitimacy. As all three historical examples demonstrate, Iraq will not be a relevant entity without the support of the international community, and especially the acceptance of nations within the region. Without such support, the potential exists for neighboring influences to negate progress and create greater impediments to conflict resolution like in Bosnia.
Seeking international consent is the strong suit of the French option. Permitting the UN to have oversight or responsibility for elements of the security and political track will encourage cooperation and participation. UNSCR 1511 indicates international willingness to support, but has not produced much support. The UN accepting the burden of responsibility may just be the impetus needed to garner international burden sharing and involvement in conflict resolution in Iraq. If this potential expansion occurs, having a security force with a larger multi-national presence will increase Iraqi legitimacy, and enhance a positive perception of the military forces.
This can certainly be a confidence building measure and quite possibly encourage international acceptance of Iraqi sovereignty.
Expanding international participation, and more importantly oversight of the civil aspects, may enhance the international support, collaboration and burden sharing that is a current weakness of U.S. policy. 57 One glaring weakness in the French alternative, is the risk taken with security operations. The contention that an immediate transition of the political process will inherently create security is too idealistic and belied by the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences. Iraqis participate in the process free of persecution. Potentially, Iraqi citizens will finally perceive that they can govern themselves and take an active role in developing their own political institutions.
Any policy chosen must involve the indigenous people of Iraq, and effectively secure the environment to instill legitimacy, or conflict resolution will be a mirage, superficial and shortlived. Iraqi society has to have more than "hope" to openly embrace the international efforts as legitimate.
RECOMMENDATION: IRAQ, AN INSPIRATION TO THE MIDDLE EAST
Given the current alternatives and the evidence of the three case studies, it is apparent that the U.S.-led coalition retaining primacy of the security track until there is a stable environment and Iraq security forces are operational is paramount for success. The lack of security could destroy any effort in the political track, and needs to be brought under control immediately. But, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the French alternatives, this issue should be resolved initially with an international police and military force that simultaneously provides security, and teaches and trains the entire Iraqi security apparatus including the national military. These intervening multi-national forces should initially operate under U.S. command and control. Then, in keeping with the IGC approach, these intervening forces should work jointly with and then for the Iraqi interior ministry. Finally, there must be a plan to hand off responsibility locally and incrementally starting from the multi-national police and military forces to the indigenous security forces, and then from the U.S. command to the Iraqi interior minister.
Regardless of where the responsibility lies at any given point, these security forces cannot exclude former regime members, especially at the local level, as long as they are loyal to the security effort. Similarly, the political process cannot prohibit qualified senior managers who do not have a proven record of corruption and abuse, even if they were members of the Baath party, and especially if they were not senior members. As Nazi officials proved to be in post-war Germany, the Baathists may better understand the previous security and political apparatus benefiting the overall effort, and again like the Nazis, may potentially provide valuable information on the current threats to stability. This element must jointly hunt for, apprehend, detain, and prosecute criminals from the previous regime, or those who violently oppose the ongoing national effort. This arrangement with this focus will build legitimacy with the Iraqis at the local level, and may encourage several more nations to provide assistance, especially those with a mutual interest in Iraq's stability, thereby furthering the legitimacy in the country and creating legitimacy within the region.
Any U.S. policy must account for the long-standing issues between the various internal and external factions before introducing any regional military presence into Iraq. As in both
Balkans operations, however, proper placement of these regional forces can facilitate a sense of trust or legitimacy with the local population. Additionally, employing security forces from regional contributors may counteract any negative influence precipitated by Iraq's neighbors, as well as diminish the external security problems. 59 It may be risky considering the volatility of the region. But a security structure that includes regional police and military forces should reduce the complex security challenges in Iraq and legitimize conflict resolution operations for the contributing nations. Furthermore, it will embolden local Iraqi legitimacy when Iraqis see numerous international uniforms helping to secure their well being, which ultimately contributes to the political and civil pursuits
As for the political track, this recommendation is aligned closely with the French option.
First, the UN needs to be the lead agency. The UN will not necessarily do a better job than the U.S., nor will it be less bureaucratic. And, it will slightly weaken the benefits of the current unity of command. But, giving the UN responsibility for the political aspects will enhance worldwide relationships, and ensure that regional powers do not perceive Iraq as a U.S. puppet or that the U.S. has ulterior motives. Drawing from the Bosnia and Kosovo blueprints, the U.S. DoD or military commander, and subsequently the Iraqi Interior Minister, can make up for the unity of command sacrifices if they work closely with the appointed UN Administrator to ensure unity of effort. Once this arrangement is completed, the UN needs to assist the IGC establish a truly representative interim government. The UN must then consider identifying local members despite their previous allegiance to Saddam Hussein, and train them to execute some responsibility, as well as empower them to modify the process to reflect their society. This will overwhelmingly reinforce the process since it will be familiar to the Iraqi people.
This representative government must have no appearance of any U.S. puppet strings.
Together with UN supervision and counsel, this interim government can draft, write, and implement a constitution, conduct elections, and create a democratic government and society.
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CONCLUSION: INNOVATIVE AND FLEXIBLE POLICY
Currently, there are factions within Iraq, the international community, and the U.S.
Congress that view U.S. policy as inappropriate or insufficient. Regardless of these disparate views, there has to be a purposeful search for ways to accommodate the explicit interest of all parties, inside and outside of Iraq, especially those with a mutual interest in the region, or there will never be conflict resolution. And, without agreement among these factions, the entire resolution process may stagnate. 62 Adopting the proposed composite U.S.-IGC-French policy alternative will enable the establishment of common goals and objectives, a coherent framework for conflict resolution, and complement the mandate for the mission in Iraq. This will hasten the legitimacy of international purpose in Iraq, the return of Iraqi sovereignty, the establishment of a democratic and stable Iraq, and the initiation of peaceful overtures in the Middle East.
Early in the conflict, the international community assumed that the war plan was a failure as the offensive temporarily stalled. But, by executing an innovative and flexible war plan, it took only 21 days for the U.S.-led military coalition to enter Baghdad. 63 Soon afterwards, President Bush announced that the coalition forces clearly won the "war," achieving conflict termination. Since then, the expanding U.S.-led coalition has turned its attention to conflict resolution. After several weeks of battling for "peace," resolution does not appear imminent, and similar cries of failure are reverberating throughout the world. The U.S. will not quiet the dissenting voices by blindly adhering to current U.S. policy, by going it alone, or simply by reaching agreement with the IGC. The current administration has to reflect on previous U.S.
conflict resolution attempts, and be bold enough to design and execute an innovative and flexible "peace" plan in the shadows of a similarly designed "war" plan. Only then will it achieve agreement among the U.S., the Iraqis, and the International Community. This composite policy, by involving the UN, a multi-national security force, and incrementally transferring control of both tracks to the Iraqis more quickly than currently planned, will produce long lasting conflict resolution in Iraq, and potentially stabilize the region.
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